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1.0 Introduction 
 
Financial markets and institutions perform an important function in the 
economic development process, particularly through their role in allocating finance to 
productive activities. This role has been well researched and documented in the 
empirical literature, using a variety of econometric techniques. By and large, this 
literature suggests that well-functioning financial institutions and markets promote 
long-run economic growth (King and Levine, 1993a, b; Levine, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Levine 2003; Demetriades and 
Andrianova, 2004; Goodhart, 2004).  Nevertheless, an interesting question remains 
why, if financial development is so good for growth, have so many countries 
remained financially under-developed? More broadly, why have some economies 
developed well-functioning financial markets and institutions, while others have not? 
Recent literature emphasises the influence of political economy factors and 
institutions as the most likely answers to the above puzzle.  
 
Using a political economy perspective, Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest 
that special interest group politics, representing established business, can explain the 
uneven evolution of capital markets. They propose an “interest group” theory of 
financial development where incumbents oppose financial development because it 
produces fewer benefits for them than for potential competitors. The incumbents will 
shape policies and institutions to their own advantage when they have the power. 
Incumbents can finance investment opportunities mainly with retained earnings, 
whereas potential competitors need external capital to start up. When a country is 
open to trade and capital flows, it is more likely to develop its financial system. This is 
because openness to both trade and finance breeds competition and threatens the 
rents of incumbents. Thus, open borders help to check the power political and 
economic elites and promote competitive markets. The Rajan and Zingales 
hypothesis has very important policy implications, calling for simultaneous trade and 
financial liberalisation. Its implications, therefore, run contrary to the sequencing 
literature, which advocates that trade liberalisation should precede financial 
liberalisation and that capital account opening should be the last stage in the 
liberalisation process (e.g. McKinnon, 1991). 
 
The uneven development of institutions such as financial regulation and the 
varying effectiveness of legal systems across countries could provide an alternative, 
  2possibly complementary, explanation of why financial development has been uneven 
across countries. Arestis and Demetriades (1997), for example, emphasise the 
importance of institutions in their discussion of the differences between finance-
growth causal patterns across countries. The argument is developed further in 
Demetriades and Andrianova (2004), who argue that the strength of institutions, such 
as financial regulation and the rule of law, may determine the success or failure of 
financial reforms. Acemoglu et al (2001), for example, argue that European 
colonisers’ willingness to develop long-lasting institutions that can help promote 
economic growth depended on the disease environment they encountered. 
Colonisers were much more willing to invest in the development of institutions that 
could enhance long-run growth in countries or regions where the mortality rate was 
low; in places with high mortality rates they were much more likely to set up 
extractive institutions.
1  This is known as the settler mortality or initial endowments 
hypothesis. 
 
Empirical evidence on the influence of either political economy factors or 
institutions, or indeed both, on financial development remains thin. The sample of 
countries used by Rajan and Zingales, dictated by limited data availability in the pre-
World War II period, means that their conclusions are, at best, tentative. Other 
authors have examined related questions but have not examined the openness 
hypothesis directly.
2 In terms of the links between financial development and 
institutions, the main focus in the literature until recently has been around the 
question of whether legal origin has an influence on capital market development (e.g. 
La Porta et al, 1997).  More, recently Beck et al (2003a) extend the focus of the 
empirical analysis to the settler mortality hypothesis.  Their findings, which are drawn 
from cross-country regressions for 70 countries, provide support for both the legal 
origins and the settler mortality hypotheses.  However, they also find that the initial 
endowments hypothesis explains more of the cross-country variation in financial 
intermediary and stock market development.  However, Beck et al (2003a) focus their 
attention on the historical determinants of financial development and do not examine 
                                                 
1
 In a similar vein, La Porta et al. (1997) argue that English common law systems offered better investor protection 
than French civil-law systems, and were, therefore, more conducive to the development of capital markets. 
2 Beck (2003) shows that countries with better-developed financial systems have higher shares of manufactured 
exports in GDP and in total merchandise exports. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) find that there is a positive 
interdependence between financial development and liberal trade policies. Levine (2001), for example, finds that 
liberalising restrictions on international portfolio flows tends to enhance stock market liquidity, and allowing greater 
foreign bank presence tends to enhance the efficiency of the domestic banking system. Chinn and Ito (2002) show 
that there is a strong relationship between capital controls and financial development. Their finding holds for less 
developed countries in terms of stock market value traded, and even more so for emerging market economies. Klein 
and Olivei (1999) point out that capital account liberalisation has a substantial impact on growth via the deepening of 
a country’s financial system in highly industrialised countries, but there is little evidence of financial liberalisation 
promoting financial development outside members of the OECD. 
  3any of the intermediate linkages.  It could be, for example, that the correlation 
between initial endowments and subsequent financial development reflects factors 
other than the development of institutions that are conducive to financial 
development.   
 
This paper provides new evidence that examines the influence of both 
openness and institutions, as channels of financial development. Specifically, it tests 
the [Rajan and Zingales, 2003] hypothesis that simultaneous openness to both trade 
and capital flows has a positive influence on financial development, in tandem with 
the [institutions] hypothesis that the quality of a country’s institutions has a separate 
influence on financial development. The paper represents an advance over previous 
empirical work in the area in several important respects. First, it provides a direct test 
of both the openness and the institutions hypotheses using appropriately specified 
financial development equations. Second, it uses a data set that is sufficiently large 
to enable robust, reasonably generalised, conclusions to be drawn; specifically, the 
sample consists of annual data from 43 developing countries, covering the period 
1980 – 2001. Third, the time dimension of the data set allows examine whether the 
estimation results are sensitive to the period under consideration, since the 1990s 
were characterised by increasing degrees of liberalisation of domestic financial 
markets compared to the 1980s
3.  Fourth, the paper utilises a variety of financial 
development and capital inflows measures, which purport to capture various aspects 
of financial deepening and capital mobility.  Finally, it employs two dynamic panel 
data techniques, namely the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the 
pooled mean group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran et al 1999) - both of which have a 
number of econometric advantages compared to traditional panel data estimation.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the empirical model and 
econometric methodology. Section 3 explains the data employed in the analysis and 
Section 4 reports and discusses the econometric results. Finally, Section 5 
summarises and concludes.   
 
 
2.0   The Empirical Model and Methodology 
 
                                                 
3 Total private capital flows to developing countries increased more than sixfold to reach US$200 billion per year 
during 1995-97 from around US$30 billion per year during 1984-86 (World Bank, 1997).  




ln FDit = β0i + β1i ln RGDPCit + β2i ln INSit + β3i ln CIFit + β4i ln TOit + εit 
 (1) 
 
where FD is an indicator of financial development, RGDPC is real GDP per capita, 
INS is institutions, CIF is capital inflows and TO is trade openness. In order to 
examine directly the hypothesis proposed by Rajan and Zingales (2003), an 
interaction term between the last two variables is also included in the model as 
follows: 
 
ln FDit = β0i + β1i ln RGDPCit + β2i ln INSit + β3i ln CIFit + β4i ln TOit + β5i ln (CIF x TO)it 
+ εit (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) provide the basis for the empirical models that are estimated in 
this paper. If β5 is found to be positive and statistically significant, then this would 
imply that the combination of financial and trade openness exerts an independent 
influence on financial development, over and above any influence each of these two 
variables may separately have on financial development.  Thus, β5 > 0 provides 
support to the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis. 
 
While cross-sectional estimation methods may, in principle, capture the long-
run relationship between the variables concerned, they do not take advantage of the 
time-series variation in the data, which could increase the efficiency of estimation. In 
addition, Rajan and Zingales (2003) point out that their theory can go some way in 
accounting for both the cross-country differences in, and the time series variation of, 
financial development. It is, therefore, preferable to estimate Equations (2) and (3) 
using panel data techniques. Two dynamic panel data methods are employed to 
estimate the two equations, namely (i) the first differenced generalised method of 
moments (GMM), and (ii) the pooled mean group (PMG) estimations.  
 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis 
 
                                                 
4
 In preliminary regressions we also included the real interest rate, which had the expected positive sign but was 
statistically insignificant.  This finding is in line with previous empirical findings in the area (e.g. Demetriades and 
Luintel, 1997 or Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). 
  5Panel GMM Estimation – Whole Sample (N > T) 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated on the entire sample using the GMM 
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). We use 4-year averages of the 
variables to impact of cyclical factors. Thus we obtain the following 4-year periods: 
1981-1984, 1985-1988, 1989-1992, 1993-1996, and 1997-2001. The GMM estimator 
is a dynamic one that estimates the model in first differences and uses lagged values 
of the variables as instruments. The starting point is a standard specification in 
levels, where the financial development (FD) is persistent, i.e. it is a function of its 
own past values. The model includes a set of independent variables Xit, which are 
assumed to be weakly exogenous, and a country fixed effect µI
 
  FDit = τ FDi,t-1 + γXit + εit + µI        ( 3 )  
 
After taking first differences, the previous equation yields: 
 
∆FDit = τ ∆FDi,t-1 + γ ∆Xit + ∆εit         
 (4) 
 
One result of the transformation is that all variables that are time-invariant, such as 
the country fixed effects, drop out from the model. A potential problem with the model 
of Equation (3) is the potential endogeneity of the control variables
5 as well as the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable FDi,t-1 and the error term εit. This 
problem can be solved by using higher-order lags of FDi,t-1 as instruments for FDi,t-1. 
For the GMM estimator to yield unbiased and consistent estimates, the validity of the 
moment conditions is required, as follows:   
 
  E [∆εit FDt-k} = E [∆εit Xt-k] = 0      ∀k  >   1       
 (5) 
 
To keep a sensible relationship between the number of cross-sectional observations 
and the number of overidentifying restrictions, only one lag of the dependent variable 
is employed as instrument. This implies that E [∆εit FDt-2] = 0 for each of the four time 
series observations, so that there are three overidentifying restrictions (4 identifying 
                                                 
5
 Recent literature has discussed the possibility of bi-directional causal effect between financial development and 
economic growth (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel and Khan, 1999). 
  6restrictions, and one to identify τ). The validity of these restrictions can then be tested 
via a Sargan test, using a χ
2 distribution with three degrees of freedom. 
 
Pooled Mean Group Estimation – Sub-Sample Countries (T > N) 
 
Since the capital market development indicators and other trade openness 
proxy variable namely import duties are only available for 16 - 20 countries or N is 
smaller than T, thus, the parameter estimate of Equations (1) and (2) are obtained by 
employing the pooled mean group (PMG) estimation proposed by Pesaran et al. 
(1999). This method is well suited to the analysis of dynamic panels that have both 
large time and cross-section data fields. In addition, this type of estimation has the 
advantage of being able to accommodate both the long run equilibrium and the 
possibly heterogeneous dynamic adjustment process.  
     
Following Pesaran et al. (1999), the unrestricted specification for the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model for the dependent variable y is  
 
                       (7)
                     i = 1,2, … N; t = 1,2, … T. 
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i µ represent the fixed effects,  i φ is a scalar coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable,  ’s is the k x 1 vector of coefficients on explanatory variables, 
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scalar coefficients on lagged first-differences of dependent variables, and  ij γ ’s are k 
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' ' − = it η ’s are 
stationary with possibly non-zero means (including fixed effects). Since Equation (7) 
can be rewritten as 
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where  η is the error correction term given by (8), hence  i φ is the error correction 
coefficient measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.  
  
The Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) 
restricts the long-run coefficients to be equal over the cross-section, but allows for 
the short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across groups on the cross-
section; that is,  θ θ = i  for all i. The hypothesis of homogeneity of the long-run policy 
parameters cannot be assumed a priori and is tested empirically in all specifications 
by a Hausman-type test (Hausman, 1978). The group-specific short-run coefficients 
and the common long-run coefficients are computed by pooled maximum likelihood 





































δ θ θ ~ ˆ = PMG , j = 0, …, q – 1,   
 
 
3.0 The  Data 
 
The data set consists of a panel of observations for a group of developing 
countries for the period 1980 – 2001. Two groups of financial development indicators 
are employed in the analysis, namely banking sector development and capital market 
development. The three conventional variables to measure the banking sector 
development are liquid liabilities, private sector credit and domestic credit provided 
by banking sector, whereas the three variables to represent capital market 
development are stock market capitalisation, total share value traded and number of 
  8companies listed
6. All these financial development variables are expressed as ratios 
to GDP except for the number of companies listed, which is divided by total 
population. The main sources of these annual data are the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank CD-ROM 2003) and Beck et al. (2003b).  
 
Annual data on real GDP per capita is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank CD-ROM 2003). The real GDP per capita is converted to US 
dollars based on 1995 constant prices.  
 
The institutions data set employed in this study was assembled by the IRIS 
Center of the University Maryland from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
– a monthly publication of Political Risk Services (PRS).
7 Following Knack and 
Keefer (1995), five PRS indicators are used to measure the overall institutional 
environment, namely: (i) Corruption (ii) Rule of Law (iii) Bureaucratic Quality (iv) 
Government Repudiation of Contracts and (v) Risk of Expropriation. The above first 
three variables are scaled from 0 to 6, whereas the last two variables are scaled from 
0 to 10. Higher values imply better institutional quality and vice versa. The institutions 
indicator is obtained by summing the above five indicators
8.  
 
Two capital inflows proxies are employed to assess whether capital inflows 
have any impact on financial development, namely private capital inflows and capital 
account liberalisation indicator constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002)
9. The first 
indicator is obtained from the World Development Indicators.  
 
The following two trade openness proxies are employed in the analysis: total 
trade as a ratio of GDP and import duties as a ratio of total imports (ID); both are 
available from World Development Indicators
10. Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest 
that openness fosters financial development. Therefore, higher import duties would 
discourage financial development or there is a negative relationship between both 
variables. As such, the import duties indicator was first converted to (1 – ID/100) in 
                                                 
6 The sample period of the number of companies listed is only covering from 1988 – 2000. 
7
 We also experienced with (English) legal origin as an alternative or additional institutional quality variable but this 
was found to be insignificant in all regressions; these results are, therefore, not reported in the paper. 
8
 The scale of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law was first converted to 0 to 10 (multiplying them by 5/3) 
to make them comparable to the other indicators. For robustness checks, we also used different weights for each 
indicator to construct the aggregate index. The estimates are similar and are available on request.  
9 The index on capital account openness from Chinn and Ito (2002) is based on the four binary dummy variables 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These 
variables are to provide information on the extent and nature of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide cross-
section of countries.  
10
 However, the import duties indicator is only available for 15 developing countries. 
  9order to have consistent positive relationship with trade openness. In other words, 
the inverse import duties indicator measures trade openness or low trade barriers, 
thus the interaction term between capital inflows and trade openness can be 
quantified since this term has positive impact on financial development as highlighted 
in the theory. 
The definitions of the financial development, capital inflows and trade 
openness indicators above data are presented in Table AI (see Appendix I).  
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics results of banking sector development 
indicators (N = 43), capital market development indicators (N = 20) and other 
variables that employed in the analysis, where the sample period is covering from 
1980 – 2001. The list of these countries is presented in Table AII and Table AIII (See 
Appendix II). There is considerable variation among these variables especially the 
financial development indicators, real GDP per capita and institutions. Malaysia, one 
of the developing countries in this group, has the highest private sector credit, 
domestic credit, market capitalisation, total share value traded, number of companies 
listed, trade openness and institutions, whereas it ranks second highest in terms of 
liquid liabilities (after Jordan) and capital inflows (after Chile). These observations 
indicate that capital inflows and trade openness may be positively correlated with 
financial development. Table 2 reports the correlation results and this table reveals 
that capital inflows and trade openness are indeed positively correlated with the 
financial development indicators. For example, the private capital inflows and trade 
openness have the highest correlation with stock market capitalisation, with 0.76 and 
0.74, respectively. 
 
4.0 Estimation  Results 
 
Panel GMM Results 
 
We first estimate equations (1) and (2) for the 43 developing countries using 
the panel GMM estimator. Two capital inflows proxies are employed namely private 
capital inflows and capital account liberalisation index. The results are reported in 
Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. Models 1 – 3 are estimates of Equation (1), 
utilising alternative proxies for financial development, where Models 4 – 6 are 
estimates of Equation (2), which includes the interaction term between capital inflows 
and trade openness.  
 
  10To start with, it is important to note that the sign of the estimated coefficients 
on real GDP per capita is consistent with theory. As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, 
real GDP per capita has a positive relationship with financial development, in all 
models. The Sargan test does not detect any problem with instrument validity, and 
the instrumental variables therefore seem to be valid and highly informative.   
 
Examining first Models 1 – 3 in Table 3, where private capital inflows is the 
proxy for capital account openness and the interaction term is absent, the results 
reveal that real GDP per capita is a statistically significant determinant of financial 
development throughout. This result seems to demonstrate that economic 
performance matters for financial development. Interestingly, the institutions variable 
is also a statistically significant determinant of financial development in all models. 
The impact of capital inflows is not significant at conventional levels, whereas trade 
openness is significant at 5 percent level in Model 2, where the financial development 
indicator is private sector credit.  
 
In Models 4 – 6 which include the interaction term, real GDP per capita 
continues to enter as a positive and significant determinant of financial development. 
The institutions variable remains significant throughout, whereas the capital inflows 
variable is statistically significant at 10 percent in Models 5 and 6. Trade openness 
remains significant when the financial development indicator is private sector credit. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant in Models 4 and 5. These findings provide support to both the openness 
and institutions hypotheses. 
 
Table 4 repeats the analysis using, however, the capital account liberalisation 
indicator constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002) as a proxy for capital inflows. The 
results are broadly similar to those reported in Table 3.  The only notable difference 
is that the interaction term appears significant in all the specifications; the exception 
is Model 6, where it is only significant at the 10% level. 
 
Pooled Mean Group Estimations Results 
 
  Table 5 reports estimates of Equations (1) and (2) that utilize the pooled 
mean group estimator with three capital market development indicators, namely 
stock market capitalization, total share value traded and number of companies listed. 
This table presents estimates of the long-run coefficients, the adjustment coefficients 
  11and Hausman test statistics. The lag order is first chosen in each country on the 
unrestricted model by the Akaike information criterion (AIC), subject to a maximum 
lag of 1. Then, using these AIC-determined lag orders, homogeneity is imposed. The 
results indicate that the joint Hausman test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis 
and this reveals that the data do not reject the restriction of common long-run 
coefficients. In addition, the Hausman test also indicates that the pooling restrictions 
cannot be rejected for the independent variables. These indicators are only available 
for 20 developing countries
11 and the sample period spans the period 1980 – 2001, 
except for the number of companies listed, for which data is only available for the 
period 1988 – 2001.  
 
The coefficients of real GDP per capita are positive and statistically significant 
throughout. The institutional quality variable is statistically significant in determining 
market capitalization and total share value traded, but is significant only at the 10% in 
the regression that explains total number of companies listed. The capital inflows 
variable is a statistically significant determinant of stock market capitalization and 
total share value traded. In contrast, trade openness has a significant influence on 
market capitalization and number of companies listed. In Models 4 – 6, the 
interaction term is statistically significant at the 1% level in two out of three models 
and significant at the 5% level in the third. Interestingly, trade openness and capital 
inflows each have an independent statistically significant influence in two out of three 
specifications.  These findings suggest that the openness hypothesis applies not only 
to the development of the banking system, but also to the development of the capital 
market.   
  
The estimated pooled mean group results when import duties indicator
12 is 
employed as an alternative proxy for trade openness are reported in Table 6. This 
indicator is found to be statistically insignificant while real GDP per capita, institutions 
and capital inflows are statistically significant in all models. However, models 
containing the interaction term demonstrate that the interaction between capital 
inflows and import duties has a positive and highly significant influence on financial 
development. Table 7 reports the analysis of Table 6 with capital market 
development indicators as the dependent variable. The import duties and institutions 
variables are statistically significant for three models, whereas real GDP per capita 
                                                 
11
 The cross-country analysis is not conducted for these capital market development indicators - stock market 
capitalisation, total share value traded and number of companies listed due to small sample size (N = 22). 
12 The import duties/total imports (ID) indicator was first converted using this formula: (1 – ID/100).  
  12and capital inflows are significant in two out of three models. Again, the estimated 
coefficients of the interaction term are both large and significant in Models 4 and 6. 
Thus, our main findings are robust to changes in the measurement of both capital 
and trade account openness.  
 
Table 8 reports the empirical results when the sample developing countries 
are further divided into three groups, namely upper middle-income, lower middle-
income and low-income. The signs of the estimated coefficients on real GDP per 
capita, institutions, capital inflows and trade openness are consistent with theory. The 
real GDP per capita and institutions retain their positive sign, and both are 
statistically significant determinants of private sector credit in all income groups. The 
capital inflows and trade openness are also statistically significant in the middle-
income countries. The interaction term indicates economically large and statistically 
significant effect on private sector credit in the upper middle-income countries, 
followed by lower middle-income and low-income countries.  
 
Table 9 repeats the analysis of Table 8 with the alternative proxy for financial 
development, namely stock market capitalisation. Again, real GDP per capita 
remains statistically significant in all three groups, while institutional quality is 
significant at 5 percent level in two middle-income groups. Interestingly, the capital 
flows and trade openness are positive and significant determinants of stock market 
capitalisation in two middle-income groups. In addition, the interaction term is highly 
significant in two middle-income groups, whereas it is significant at the 5% level in 
low-income countries. Overall, these findings provide further support to both the 
openness and institutions hypotheses.  They also suggest, however, that openness 
to trade and capital flows are most potent in promoting financial development in 





The evidence presented utilising panel data analysis in a group of developing 
countries, provides varying degrees of support to the [Rajan and Zingales, 2003] 
hypothesis that simultaneous opening of both the capital and trade accounts will 
promote financial development. The evidence is robust to alternative measures of 
both trade account and capital account openness.  The evidence remains valid for a 
variety of financial development indicators, including 3 indicators of banking system 
  13development and 3 indicators of capital market development.  The findings also 
suggests that trade openness affects developing countries’ financial development 
differentially. In middle-income countries, trade promotes financial development; and 
the effect is smaller in low-income economies. On the other hand, capital inflows 
have a positive effect in determining financial development, especially capital market 
development in middle-income countries. Our findings also suggest that institutional 
quality is a robust and statistically significant determinant of financial development, 
providing support to the case made by Arestis and Demetriades (1997, 1999).   
 
In terms of policy implications, our findings suggest that simultaneously 
stimulating foreign capital inflows and trade openness, improving institutions and 
promoting economic development will encourage the development of both capital 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
i. Financial Development: Banking Sector Development Indicators 
N = 43  LL PRI  DOC
RGDP
C INS CIF TO 
Mean 40.62 31.25  45.44
1812.9
4 27.18 2.47 62.61 
Std Dev  20.17 19.55  25.18
1810.5
9 4.79 1.77 26.52 
Maximu
m  102.06 91.80 109.33
7723.2
5 36.06 7.70 144.56 
Minimu
m 14.88 3.83  -32.27 153.27 18.53 0.18 16.89 
    
ii. Financial Development: Capital Market Development Indicators 
N = 20  MC VT  NC
RGDP
C INS CIF TL 




9 28.75 2.79 66.21 




9 4.26 1.81 29.43 
Maximu




4 36.95 7.53 149.14 
Minimu
m 0.79 0.04 
0.0001
0 250.94 20.43 0.58 19.57 
Note: LL = Liquid Liabilities/GDP; PRI = Private Sector Credit/GDP; DOC = 
Domestic Credit/GDP; RGDPC = Real GDP Per Capita; INS = Institutions; 
CIF = Private Capital Flows; TO = Trade Openness; MC = Stock Market 
Capitalisation/GDP; VT = Total Share Value Traded/GDP; NC = Number of 
Companies Listed/Population 
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Table 2: Correlation Results 
 
i. Financial Development: Banking Sector Development Indicators 
N = 43  LL  PRI  DOC
RGDP
C INS CIF TO 
LL 1.00     
PRI 0.70  1.00   
DOC 0.89  0.74  1.00  
RGDP
C  0.37 0.55 0.46 1.00  
INS 0.26  0.37  0.35 0.46 1.00  
CIF 0.23  0.42  0.29 0.51 0.28 1.00  
TO 0.36  0.23  0.13 0.10 0.04 0.07 1.00 
      
ii. Financial Development: Capital Market Development Indicators 
N = 20  MC  VT  NC
RGDP
C INS CIF TO 
MC 1.00        
VT 0.72  1.00       
NC 0.46  0.10  1.00     
RGDP
C  0.21  0.49  0.42 1.00    
INS 0.53  0.64  0.53 0.63 1.00    
CIF 0.76  0.40  0.47 0.30 0.51 1.00  
TO 0.74  0.43  0.60 0.10 0.27 0.54 1.00 
Note: LL = Liquid Liabilities/GDP; PRI = Private Sector Credit/GDP; DOC = 
Domestic Credit/GDP; RGDPC = Real GDP Per Capita; INS = Institutions; 
CIF = Private Capital Flows; TO = Trade Openness; MC = Stock Market 
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Table 3: Results of Dynamic Panel Data GMM Estimations 
(Dependent Variable: Financial Development) 
Trade Openness (TO): Total Trade/GDP   









  Without Interaction Term 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
RGDPC 0.28  (2.35)**
  0.32 (2.43)**
  0.30 (2.15)**
 
INS  0.17 (2.08)**  0.21 (2.14)**  0.23 (2.25)** 
CIF  0.09 (1.09)  0.11 (1.97)*  0.08 (1.26) 
TO 0.15  (1.92)*
  0.20 (2.27)**  0.18 (1.06) 
Sargan  Test  0.26 0.24 0.32 
     
  With Interaction Term 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
RGDPC 0.25  (2.23)**
  0.28 (2.46)**
  0.22 (2.27)**
 
INS  0.15 (2.04)**  0.18 (2.08)**  0.20 (2.25)** 
CIF 0.10  (1.25)
  0.12 (1.81)*  0.11 (1.67)* 
TO  0.12 (1.14)  0.17 (2.15)**  0.15 (1.29) 
CIF x TO  0.35 (2.36)**




Sargan  Test  0.35 0.32 0.39 
     
N  43 43 43 
T  5 5 5 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, ** and * 
denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The figures 
reported for the Sargan test are the p-values for the null hypothesis, 
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Table 4: Results of Dynamic Panel Data GMM Estimations 
(Dependent Variable: Financial Development) 
Trade Openness (TO): Total Trade/GDP   









  Without Interaction Term 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
RGDPC 0.29  (2.39)**
  0.33 (2.45)**
  0.32 (2.24)**
 
INS  0.18 (2.14)**  0.22 (2.26)**  0.22 (2.16)** 
CIF  0.15 (1.56)  0.18 (2.19)**  0.12 (1.46) 
TO 0.17  (1.90)*
  0.19 (2.18)**  0.18 (1.30) 
Sargan  Test  0.28 0.25 0.36 
     
  With Interaction Term 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
RGDPC 0.26  (2.21)**
  0.30 (2.35)**
  0.24 (2.24)**
 
INS  0.16 (2.07)**  0.18 (2.06)**  0.19 (2.13)** 
CIF 0.12  (1.50)
  0.13 (1.88)*  0.12 (1.60) 
TO  0.15 (1.84)  0.16 (2.07)**  0.14 (1.32) 
CIF x TO  0.31 (2.28)**




Sargan  Test  0.30 0.33 0.37 
     
N  43 43 43 
T  5 5 5 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, ** and * 
denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The figures 
reported for the Sargan test are the p-values for the null hypothesis, 
valid specification.  
 
 
  21Table 5: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL  
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Capital Market Development) 
Trade Openness (TO): Total Trade/GDP 
Capital Inflows (CIF): Private Capital Flows 
















Model 1  Hausma
n Test 
Model 2  Hausm
an Test 
Model 3  Hausm
an Test 

























































 -0.03   
(-2.19)***
 






















Model 4  Hausma
n Test 
Model 5  Hausm
an Test 
Model 6  Hausm
an Test 

































































Adjustment -0.33   
(-2.77)***
 
 -0.25   
(-2.66)***
 


















         
N 
 
20   20  20  
T 
 
22   22  14  
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-
value. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  22Table 6: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Banking Sector Development) 
Trade Openness (TO): Import Duties/Total Imports (ID) 
Capital Inflows (CIF): Private Capital Flows 











Model 1  Hausma
n Test 
Model 2  Hausma
n Test 




























































  -0.36  
(-3.51)***
 



















     




Model 4  Hausma
n Test 
Model 5  Hausma
n Test 




































































Adjustment -0.39   
(-3.27)***
 
  -0.40  
(-3.74)***
 






















15  15   15   
T 
 
22  22   22   
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-
value. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
  23Table 7: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Capital Market Development) 
Trade Openness (TO): Import Duties/Total Imports (ID) 
Capital Inflows (CIF): Private Capital Flows 














Model 1  Hausma
n Test 
Model 2  Hausma
n Test 
Model 3  Hausma
n Test 

























































  -0.20  
(-2.26)**
 


















      




Model 4  Hausma
n Test 
Model 5  Hausma
n Test 
Model 6  Hausma
n Test 




































































Adjustment -0.30   
(-3.72)***
 
  -0.35  
(-3.60)***
 



















         
N 
 
12   12  14  
T 
 
22   22  14  
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-
value. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
  24Table 8: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL from three Income Groups 
Dependent Variable: Private Sector Credit 
Trade Openness (TO): Total Trade/GDP 
Capital Inflows (CIF): Private Capital Flows 
 





















































N    12 15 16 
T  22 22 22 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test, which are 
p-values. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL from three Income Groups 
Dependent Variable: Stock Market Capitalisation 
Trade Openness (TO): Total Trade/GDP 
Capital Inflows (CIF): Private Capital Flows 
 





















































N    6 8 6 
T  22 22 22 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test, which are 
p-values. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 27
 
Table AI: Definition and Source of the Data 
  Variable Definition Source 
Liquid Liabilities/GDP (%) 
(1980 – 2001, N = 43)) 
- Liquid liabilities the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus transferable 
deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign currency 
transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus 
travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual 
funds or market funds held by residents. 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank CD-ROM, 2003) 
 
Private Sector Credit/GDP 
(%) 
(1980 – 2001, N = 43)) 
- Financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for 
repayment.  
World Development Indicators 
 
Domestic Credit Provided by 
Banking Sector (%) 
(1980 – 2001, N = 43)) 
- includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis.  The banking sector includes monetary 
authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are 
available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such 
liabilities as time and savings deposits).  




(1980 – 2001, N = 20)) 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of 
shares outstanding.  
Beck et al. (2003b). 
 
Total Share Value 
Traded/GDP (%) 
(1980 – 2001, N = 20)) 




(1988 – 2001, N = 20) 
Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the 
country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
World Development Indicators 
 
Private capital flows, net total  
(US$) 
(1980 – 2001, N =43) 
Net private capital flows consist of private debt and non-debt flows. Private debt flows include 
commercial bank lending, bonds, and other private credits; non-debt private flows are foreign 
direct investment and portfolio equity investment. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Development Indicators 
 
Total Trade/GDP (%) 
(1980 – 2001, N = 43) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
World Development Indicators 
 
Import Duties/Total Imports 
(%) 
(1980 – 2001, N = 15) 
Import duties comprise all levies collected on goods at the point of entry into the country. The 
levies may be imposed for revenue or protection purposes and may be determined on a 
specific or ad valorem basis, as long as they are restricted to imported products. Data are 
shown for central government only. 
World Development Indicators 
 
Appendix I 
 Appendix II 
 
Table AII: The List of Developing Countries 
 
Sample of Banking sector Development (N = 43) 
1. Algeria  12. Gambia  23. Malta  34. Sri Lanka 
2. Bangladesh  13. Ghana  24. Malaysia 
35. Syrian Arab 
Republic 
3. Bolivia  14. Guatemala  25. Mexico  36. Thailand  
4. Botswana  15. Honduras  26. Morocco  37. Togo 
5. Cameroon  16. India  27. Niger 
38. Trinidad and 
Tobago 
6. Chile  17. Indonesia  28. Nigeria  39. Tunisia 
7. Costa Rica  18. Jamaica  29. Pakistan  40. Turkey 
8. Cote d’lvoire  19. Jordan 
30. Papua New 
Guinea  41. Uruguay 
9. Ecuador  20. Kenya  31. Philippines  42. Venezuela 
10. Egypt  21. Korea  32. Senegal  43. Zimbabwe 
11. El Salvador  22. Malawi  33. Sierra Leone   
 
 
Sample of Capital Market Development (N = 20) 
1. Chile  11. Mexico 
2. Cote d'Ivoire  12. Morocco 
3. Egypt  13. Nigeria 
4. India  14. Pakistan 
5. Indonesia  15. Philippines 
6. Jamaica  16. Sri Lanka 
7. Jordan  17. Thailand  
8. Kenya  18. Trinidad and Tobago 
9. Korea  19. Turkey 
10. Malaysia  20. Uruguay 
 
  28